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1. Introducing an outcome spectrum in social trust analysis  
An overview of literature on the relationship between the state and social capital allows us 
to draw certain conclusions, which open up further research. The analysis of literature provides 
evidence that points out the lack of empirical analysis of the effects social policies have on social 
trust. The studies are mainly theoretical and speculate on the kind of relationship in question while 
rarely employing quantitative methods of analysis to check the plausibility of the ideas underlying 
the relationship.   
The studies on the crowding-out hypothesis are an exception here, since they usually 
include an empirical analysis on the impact social spending has on social trust. However, these 
studies tend to operationalize welfare state development through social spending measured as a 
percentage of GDP. This approach is false, since it does not reflect the actual level of support 
welfare states provide to individuals since the level of social spending depends not only on the 
amount of social benefits paid but also on the level of coverage rate. The same level of spending 
can thus be obtained in countries with higher benefit levels but smaller coverage rates or in 
countries with lower benefit levels but higher coverage rates. Moreover, this measure of welfare 
state development does not fully reflect the dynamics of state intervention in the form of social 
policy since an increase in the level of spending can also result from the fact that the number of 
eligible recipients increased while benefit levels remained unchanged.  
The traditional way of operationalizing welfare state development thus fails to measure the 
extent to which the state affects individual well-being. It completely ignores the micro-level 
foundations that underlie such macro-level measures as social spending, since it is completely 
detached from the extent to which social spending allows the outsourcing of individuals from the 
market.  On the other hand, social spending reflects the process of state intervention than its 
outcomes. The need therefore consists in introducing an outcome spectrum in the analysis of 
welfare state effects.  This problem is to some extent solved in the studies that are based on 
including dummies for Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology (Van Oorschot and Arts, 
2005). Such an approach usually demonstrates that social democratic welfare regimes have higher 
levels of social trust compared to conservative and liberal regimes. But this measure is not perfect 
either since it still remains unclear whether it is the level of benefit generosity or the type of social 
stratification resulting from the organization of social rights that is responsible for the variation in 
social trust across welfare regimes. It should not be forgotten that Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
regime typology is itself a multidimensional concept, which is created along dimensions of 
decommodification, stratification , and de-familiarization. 
The general logic of the analysis thus triggers the need to find a new way of 
operationalizing welfare states, which would more accurately approximate the degree of their 
development while still being directly linked to the outcomes of intervention in societal 
arrangements at the micro-level. Such a measure can in our opinion be obtained by decomposing 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology into two dimensions and directly relating each 
dimension to social trust indexes. These dimensions are decommodification and stratification that 
both assess the effects on social trust of the degree of outsourcing of individuals from the market, 
and the stratification mechanism. The main advantage of this approach consists in measuring the 
development of welfare states through their outcomes, which brings a new spectrum to the study 
of welfare state effects on social trust.  
Moreover, we also intend to check how the level of decommodification for the selected 
social provisions affects trust indexes among their direct recipients. It will directly contribute to 
the methodology of the analysis of social capital and will require the reconsideration of all the 
previous findings if welfare states effects are found to be policy specific.  
 
2. Decommodification and social trust levels  
In the previous analysis, we used social spending as a primary empirical basis for 
evaluating welfare state activities. However, it should be noted that spending does not provide a 
sufficient indication of a welfare state’s effects on individual life chances. The tendency in the 
recent literature consists rather in using the welfare regime typology constructed by Esping-
Andersen. The latter is grounded in the two key welfare characteristics: the degree of 
decommodification and social stratification.   
Decommodification stems from the idea that the mainsprings of modern capitalism lie in 
the process by which both human needs and labor power become commodities. As a result, an 
individual’s well-being tends to depend on the relationship to the cash nexus. Esping-Andersen 
(1990) recognizes however that commodification itself would have negative consequences on 
labor force reproduction as well as destroy the relationship between the demand and the supply of 
labor force. In other words, if a labor force is nothing more than a commodity, it will likely destruct 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). It happens because the commodification of both wants and people 
weakens individual workers. This lies in the fact that the labor force as commodity has some 
peculiarities. First, it cannot be sold with delays since workers must survive and reproduce both 
themselves and the society they live in. Moreover, as commodities, workers are captive to powers 
beyond their control by social contingences such as illness or business cycles. Apart from that, free 
competition among workers may put pressure on wages, whose level may not reach the point 
enough for reproduction. Finally, without decommodification, workers are incapable of the 
collective action required for labor-movement development.  
There is hence pressure for decommodification as a precondition for system survival as 
such. The concept in Esping-Andersen’s definition refers to the degree to which individuals or 
families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). This conflict was evolved around the question about the degree to which 
market immunity is permissive, that is, the strength, scope and quality of social rights. He 
distinguishes between conservative, liberal, and socialism responses to commodification.  
The hallmark of conservative ideology is the idea that the commodification of individuals 
is morally degrading, socially corrupting, atomizing, and anomic. Individuals are not meant to 
compete or struggle, but to subordinate self-interest to recognized authority and prevailing 
institutions. He distinguishes between several models here: feudal, corporativist, and etatist. He 
further specifies that feudal ideals are strongly antagonistic to the commodity status: markets do 
not matter and wage labor is only marginally important for human well-being. Corporate societies 
emerged among artisans and craftsmen as a means to close ranks and monopolize entry, 
membership, prices and products. Later, they were often transformed into mutual societies. Etatist 
tradition is motivated by social integration, the preservation of authority, and the battle against 
capitalism. He concludes that etatist conservatism saw in social rights a solution to the ‘social 
question’.  
Esping-Andersen sees the conservative foundations of social rights as the historical origins 
of modern social policy. He asserts that in almost every country, it was a conservative tradition 
that gave rise to the first systematic and deliberate attacks on the commodification of labor. There 
are two reasons for this. First, these conservative forces feared that the development of liberalism, 
democracy, and capitalism would destroy the institutions upon which their power and privileges 
were based. Second, the pre-commodified status of workers was a model that was already available 
and also present in the heyday of laissez-faire: it was a response that came naturally and claimed 
considerable legitimacy. He elaborates by saying that guilds had the chance to be transformed into 
mutual societies, the capitalist companies offered a menu of social benefits outside of the work 
contract, and paternalism was not something that was especially contradictory to the 
entrepreneurial spirit (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
The second form is liberalism. The general assumption of liberalism holds in Esping-
Andersen’s view in that the market is emancipator: it is the best possible shell for self-reliance and 
industriousness. If not interfered with, he writes, its self-regulatory mechanisms will ensure that 
all who want to work will be employed and will thus be able to secure their own welfare. Private 
life may be wrought with insecurity and danger, poverty or helplessness is in principle unlikely. 
Yet if it occurs, this is not the system’s fault but merely a consequence of an individual’s lack of 
foresight and thrift. In all such cases, the liberal dogma is forced to seek resources in pre-capitalist 
institutions of social aid such as the family, church and the community. However, Esping-
Andersen emphasizes that liberalism recognizes to some extent the rationale of social intervention. 
It does so only in the principle of public goods, and finds two acceptable answers for the system. 
One is to transfer a modified version of the old poverty laws into a framework of means-tested 
social assistance which ensures that non market income is reserved for those who are unable to 
participate in the market. Another was a preference for privately organized insurance in the market 
and public social insurance, which would perform like its private-sector kin by pegging 
entitlements and benefits to employment, work performance, and contributions.  
The third form is socialism which, according to Esping-Andersen, has a close kinship with 
the corporative conservative tradition with regard to embryonic policies of de-commodification. 
He shows that early labor movements were largely built around unions, mutual-aid societies, and 
sometimes a political party. However, soon the scope and quality of social rights were seen as a 
precondition for the larger struggle of socialists and not merely the fruits of its final success. It was 
through this strategic realignment that socialism, he emphasizes, eventually embraced the welfare 
state as the focus of its long-term project. It is in this sense that social democracy becomes 
synonymous with welfare stateism.  
Esping-Andersen characterizes the socialist decommodification strategy with two features. 
First, they focus their policies on upgrading benefits and minimizing social stigma. The other 
characteristic of socialist decommodification is the attempt to use universal coverage for social 
rights. As a result, what characterizes all early social policies is the notion of basic or minimal 
social rights: installing strong entitlements at fairly modest benefit levels and typically limiting it 
to the core areas of human need (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The distinctive principle of 
decommodification in the socialist view is hence the idea that the status of welfare clients should 
impose no decline in living standards, even over an extended period of time, allowing for a 
strengthening of individual independence.  
In his empirical analysis of decommodification, Esping-Andersen distinguishes between 
three main groups on the basis of a combined decommodification score for the three programs 
(pension, sickness, and unemployment) in 18 OECD nations. Based on how nations cluster around 
the mean, he distinguishes between the following groups of countries: Anglo-Saxon nations were 
all found at the bottom of the ranking, the Scandinavian countries were placed at the top. In 
between these two extremes, he places the continental European countries; some of them 
(especially Belgium and the Netherlands) however fall closer to Nordic countries. In other words, 
a low level of decommodification is found in countries with a history dominated by liberalism. In 
social democratically dominated welfare states, the level of decommodification is highest. Finally, 
conservative countries are in the middle, where social rights are extended outside the market, but 
there is a stronger accent of social control than in the case of social democracy. These results are 
supported by the data presented below which provide levels of decommodification and benefit 
generosity indexes. Both indexes are calculated by Scruggs and Allan (2006b) by replicating 
Esping-Andersen’s analysis for 18 OECD nations. The benefit generosity index is calculated by 
applying the general method of scoring the countries used by Esping-Andersen. The main 
difference with the decommodification index is that they use different data for replacement rates, 
duration limits, qualifying periods, waiting, and coverage for three social programs: 
unemployment, sickness, and pensions. The data upon which both indexes are calculated are 
provided in their publication (Scruggs and Allan, 2006b). 
 
Table 1.: Decommodification and Benefit generosity indexes by welfare regime type 
   Mean value 
 
St. deviation 
Social democratic   Decommodification 
index  
36.2 4.02 
Benefit generosity 
index  
33.1 3.67 
Liberal  Decommodification 
index  
18.2 4.38 
Benefit generosity 
index  
21.9 2.21 
Conservative  Decommodification 
index  
28.75 2.21 
Benefit generosity 
index  
27.5 4.69 
 Source: Scruggs and Allan (2006b) 
 
The table shows that both indexes support Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology. 
The index is highest for social democratic welfare regimes. Conservative regimes come next with 
an index level somewhat less than for Scandinavian countries. Liberal welfare regimes close the 
ranking with the lowest index levels out of the three groups. It should be noted that the benefit 
generosity index varies less across welfare regime types compared to the decommodification 
index, but it still repeats the distribution across nations found in the case of the benefit generosity 
index. We will use the benefit generosity index for the analysis since it reflects more accurately 
decommodification levels in the selected countries.  
The relationship between decommodification levels and trust indicators will be examined 
again at both the individual and aggregated levels. The aggregated level analysis relates the 
average level of social trust indicators across the countries to their level of decommodification, 
while sequentially controlling for country-level characteristics.  
At the aggregated level, the results provide evidence that advocates for the presence of 
crowding-in effects in social trust formation of both forms. More specifically, interpersonal and 
institutional trust is found to positively correlate with benefit generosity indexes. Moreover, this 
relationship is statistically significant for both interpersonal and institutional trust. However, it 
should be noted that controlling for country level characteristics changes the relationship under 
analysis in a different way.  
If we sequentially control for country-level characteristics, the correlation between 
decommodification scores and social trust loses its strength and remains in many cases statistically 
insignificant. In particular, controlling for income inequality strongly influences the relationship 
in question. Income inequality variable is most influential out of all five covariates. More 
specifically, when controlling for income inequality levels, the positive relationship between 
decommodification scores and institutional trust becomes negative and also remains statistically 
significant. In the case of interpersonal trust, the relationship loses completely its strength. It again 
can be considered proof that the effects of decommodification on social trust are absorbed by the 
inequality variable, which means the effects of welfare states are mediated through the reduction 
of inequality. This should be again regarded as evidence of the integration argument, which 
emphasizes that welfare states raise social trust levels by keeping individuals socially integrated 
and by reducing income inequality levels.  
 
Table 2.: The correlation between decommodification levels and social trust, 
controlling for country-level characteristics1  
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
Another interesting point that arises when controlling for inequality is the fact that the 
direct effects of decommodification are negative for institutional trust. This means that welfare 
states crowd-out institutional trust when their redistributive effect is controlled for. However, the 
mechanism of this erosion still remains unclear here. As in the previous case, it is possible to say 
that the effects of welfare states on social trust hence are at least dubious. Decommodification 
                                                          
1 * - 10% ,  ** 5%, *** 1% and less  
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2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
0.535** 
 
0.569* 
 
 
 
 
0.732** 
 
0.459 
 
 
 
 
0.451* 
 
0.339 
 
 
 
 
 
0.019 
 
-0.359* 
 
 
 
 
0.408* 
 
0.037* 
 
 
 
 
0.518 
 
0.279 
levels boost social trust through the reduction of income inequality. On the other hand, it erodes 
trust levels by de-motivating social networks.   
An interesting conclusion can also be drawn when controlling for corruption levels. In the 
cases of institutional trust, the correlation coefficients with decommodification scores lose their 
value when controlling for this country characteristic. It shows that people form trust in public 
welfare state institutions mainly based on their performance, while particularly taking into account 
corruption levels. The effects of welfare states on social trust thus have to do with the 
characteristics of an institution’s performance. If they are considered to treat people equally, it 
forms necessary grounds for the high evaluation of public welfare state institutions, thus resulting 
in higher trust in them. This can also be considered a confirmation of the macro-level institutional 
argument, which emphasizes the importance of the quality of performance by public institutions 
in the process of trust formation.  
The other country-level covariates conduct some influence on the relationship between 
decommodification levels and social trust. Controlling for the percentage of Protestants living in 
a country reduces the value of the coefficients but the correlation coefficients are not found to be 
statistically significant. The same influence on the relationship in question is found in the wealth 
variable. When controlling for the GDP of a country, a positive sign is present for both forms of 
trust, although it only remains statistically significant for interpersonal trust. Controlling for 
fractionalization rends the relationship insignificant in terms of institutional trust. For interpersonal 
trust, it remains significant and even increases its value somewhat.  
Thus, the aggregated-level analysis advocates for the presence of crowding-in effects, 
which remain statistically significant even after controlling for some country-level variables. 
Decommodification hence tends to be positively associated with social trust, even while 
controlling for fractionalization, wealth, and corruption. In the rest of the cases, the effects are not 
statistically significant. The negative relationship in question is found only when controlling for 
income inequality.   
Before proceeding to the individual level analysis of decommodification effects, we will 
analyze the relationship between welfare regime types and social trust levels. If the crowding out 
hypothesis holds true, then we expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 1.: in social democratic welfare regimes, the level of social trust will be lower than in 
conservative and liberal regimes, 
 
Hypothesis 2.: in conservative welfare regimes, the level of both forms of trust will be lower than 
in liberal regimes. 
The results again provide evidence that suggest that higher levels of trust can be found in 
countries that spend more on social welfare programs. In the case of institutional trust, we find that 
in conservative welfare regimes, confidence is usually 0.832 units lower compared to Nordic 
countries, when all other variables hold constant. In liberal welfare regimes, this difference 
increases to 0.981. In other words, institutional trust levels in liberal countries appear to be on 
average 0.981 units lower than in social democratic countries.  
 
 
 
Table 3.: Interpersonal and institutional trust by welfare regime type  
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
 
 
 
 
-0.832*** 
-0.981*** 
Ref/category  
 
0.135*** 
 
0.421*** 
 
 
0.048 
0.128 
0.224 
 
-0.155*** 
 
0.120** 
 
 
Ref/category 
-0.130* 
0.175** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.054 
0.132** 
 
-0.376*** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.140* 
0.092 
0.113 
0.071 
 
9.267 (0.111) 
 
 
0.223 (0.017) 
 
 
 
 
-0.830*** 
-0.981*** 
Ref/category 
 
0.267*** 
 
0.394*** 
 
 
-0.192*** 
0.038 
-0.020 
 
-0.030*** 
 
0.068** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.159*** 
0.177*** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.112*** 
0.705*** 
 
-0.263*** 
 
 
Ref/category 
0.066* 
0.217*** 
0.423*** 
0.575*** 
 
not calculated  
 
 
0.140 (0.013) 
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Volunteering  
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Religiousness 
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15-29 
30 – 44 
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Upper  
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1st  qu.  
2nd qu. 
3rd qu. 
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5th qu. 
 
Correlation at level 
1 
Correlation at level 
2 
 
For interpersonal trust the relationship has the same nature. Conservative welfare regimes 
are found to be less trusting of others: the odds are 56.4 percent less than in social democratic 
states. This difference becomes bigger when comparing liberal and Scandinavian countries: the 
odds of trusting tend to be 62.6 percent less in Anglo-Saxon countries compared to Nordic 
countries.  
Therefore, the analysis of social trust levels by welfare regime type provides results that 
point out that social democratic countries with generous social rights and higher levels of 
decommodification are associated with higher levels of trust of both forms. Conservative welfare 
regimes have lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, but still higher than in liberal 
countries. The results should however be interpreted with some caution since the difference 
between welfare regime types consists not only in the level of decommodification but also in the 
way social benefits are designed, implemented, and financed. It is thus possible to assume that this 
difference is die not to welfare regime type but to the way welfare regimes organize and deliver 
social benefits, which reflects the principles on which the provision of social rights occurs. 
Another danger in the welfare regime typology for the analysis of social trust is that this 
typology reflects the combined effects of decommodification and stratification. It is difficult to 
infer based on welfare regime dummies whether the positive difference in favor of social 
democratic welfare systems is a result of higher decommodification or if is just the effect of 
stratification, which reflects the nature of social rights. 
The third drawback of the welfare regime dummies approach is the critique that this 
typology is not perfect. Baannik and Hoogenboom (2007) for instance demonstrate that Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regime typology is to some extent inconsistent. Orloff (1993) argues that the 
gender dimension is poorly accounted for in Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology and 
criticizes the power resources analysts’ understanding of citizenship and their analytic scheme for 
describing social policy regimes. Bonoli (2001) concludes that Esping-Andersen’s approach is just 
part of the quantification tradition, which reflects the ‘how much’  dimension and completely 
ignores the ‘how’ dimension.    
Finally, the fourth drawback is that there is much variation in decommodification scores 
even among similar welfare regimes, which can be inferred from the high value of standard 
deviation provided in Table 7.1. There is thus a certain loss of information, when combining 
countries among welfare regime type.  
It is hence plausible to directly relate decommodification levels to social trust indexes. Our 
expectations are based on an extrapolation of the classical crowding-out hypothesis. In particular, 
we expect (Hypothesis 4) higher levels of social trust to be found in countries with lower 
decommodification levels. In other words, an increase in benefit generosity levels should lead to 
a decrease in both forms of social trust.  
The results of the empirical analysis are provided in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.: Influence of decommodification levels on social trust indexes 2 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
The individual-level analysis provides empirical evidence that again advocates for the 
presence of crowding-in rather than crowding-out. Benefit generosity enhances both forms of trust. 
An increase in the level of benefit generosity by one point leads to an increase in institutional trust 
by 0.088 points when other variables are constant. In the case of interpersonal trust, a one point 
increase in the level of benefit generosity entails a 3.45 percent increase in the odds of trusting.  
                                                          
2
 The coefficients on the control variable are not reported since they are given in Table 7.3. 
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
Benefit generosity index  
 
Benefit generosity index  
 
Benefit 
generosity  
Index  
 
 
0.088*** 
 
0.034*** 
Variance at the 
individual level  
 
 
9.273 (0.111) Not calculated  
Variance at the 
country level  
 
 
0.298 (0.028) 0.196 (0.013) 
Thus, the analysis provides results that advocate for crowding-in effects.  Welfare states 
measured through decommodification levels have positive effects on social trust formation. Higher 
decommodification levels lead to higher levels of social trust. When countries spend more on 
outsourcing individuals from the market, they directly and indirectly increase their trust levels. It 
however remains unclear through which mechanisms the effect materializes. We do not control 
for country-level covariates due to a small number of cases at the second level. We cannot hence 
infer about the nature of the effects decommodification has on interpersonal and institutional trust.  
What can be also mentioned here is that in spite of the widely supported crowding-out 
hypothesis, an alternative measure of welfare state development provides similar results. As in the 
case of total social spending, we find that public social arrangements reinforce trust levels in 
society. Public policy helps build necessary preconditions for high regards about the state, which 
lies at the roots of higher trust in public welfare institutions. Social policy also contributes to 
creating a favorable environment that enhances trust in other people. In a stronger state, people 
might feel more secure, which leads to more pro-social behavior.  
The question that arises here concerns generalizing the positive effects of 
decommodification for all social provisions. It is plausible to assume that the effects can be policy 
specific due to the existence of the functional dimension. An additional analysis should hence be 
conducted to investigate the interaction between the outcome and the functional dimensions in 
order to specify whether or not  the effects of decommodification can be policy specific. In the 
case of policy specific effects, the coefficients on decommodification calculated for pension and 
unemployment policies will differ from the general decommodification index. The analysis is 
conducted for pensioners by directly relating decommodification scores for pension policy to trust 
levels among pensioners. On the other hand, we relate the level of decommodification of 
unemployment policy to trust levels among the unemployed.  
It should be noted that welfare regimes strongly differ from each other in putting a different 
emphasis on decommodifying people that experience the two social risks: unemployment and 
retirement. The general logic of decommodifying remains valid: Scandinavian welfare regimes 
provide the highest level of decommodification (13.2. for pension and 9.7 for unemployment 
policies), liberal regimes limit it to the minimum (7.7. for pension and 6.0 for unemployment 
policies), while conservative regimes are situated somewhere in between (11.1.  for pension and 
8.2. for unemployment policies).3  
These figures also illustrate a different emphasis that welfare regimes put on pension and 
unemployment policies. In trying to find a balance between these two social provisions, the 
countries usually end up guaranteeing higher levels of decommodification to pensioners than the 
unemployed, which reflects the common view that pensioners are more deserving of public support 
than the unemployed. More specifically, Scandinavian states provide pensioners with higher 
decommodification levels, while giving the unemployed a lower level of outsourcing from the 
market (but still the highest in Europe). The same tendency is present in conservative welfare 
regimes, although the overall level of decommodification is lower for both pensioners and the 
unemployed. Liberal states rely heavily on the market to ensure low levels of decommodification 
for both social provisions, making almost no distinction between pensioners and the unemployed 
in securing their levels of decommodification. 
 
                                                          
3
 Own calculations based on Bambra (2006) 
 Table 5.: Decommodification levels for pension and unemployment policies and social 
trust: an aggregated analysis.  
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
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1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.109 
 
0.330 
 
 
 
 
0.030 
 
0.406 
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0.354 
 
 
 
 
-0.394 
 
0.189 
 
 
 
 
0.030 
 
0.429 
 
 
 
 
0.085 
 
0.373 
Decommodification of  
unemployment policy 
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.420 
 
0.059 
 
 
 
 
 
0.326 
 
0.078 
 
 
 
 
 
0.225 
 
0.176 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.272 
 
 
 
 
 
0.473 
 
0.135 
 
 
 
 
 
0.374 
 
0.064 
 The aggregated level of analysis does not provide statistically significant results that allow 
for credible inferences. What can be said is that the level of decommodification of pensions causes 
a crowding-out of interpersonal trust that disappears when controlling for corruption, 
fractionalization, and the percentage of Protestants living in a country. Institutional trust among 
pensioners tends to positively co-vary with the decommodification levels of pensions, even after 
sequentially controlling for all five covariates.  
Relating the decommodification levels of unemployment policies to social trust levels 
among the unemployed shows a positive correlation. Only when controlling for the level of income 
inequality does the positive correlation turn negative, which points to the presence of crowding-
out effects.  
Again, out of the five covariates, income inequality is the most influential variable. It seems 
that all positive effects of decommodification on social trust stem from the redistributive effects 
of social policies. The general logic assumes that in countries, where redistributive effects are 
higher, levels of social trust are also higher. As in the previous case, we see a negative relationship 
between decommodification and social trust after isolating the effects of income inequality. But 
again, it is difficult to explain the mechanisms of these effects.  
The individual level of analysis also advocates for the presence of policy specific effects. 
When disaggregating total decommodification levels on a functional basis, we see a positive 
relationship, such as in the case of the cumulative decommodification score. Both pension and 
unemployment policies show a positive relationship between their levels of decommodification 
and institutional trust. Moreover, this positive effect is much larger for pension and unemployment 
policy than for the cumulative decommodification score. Higher decommodification levels hence 
tend to enhance confidence in public welfare institutions. It is plausible to assume that decent 
levels of outsourcing of individuals from the market provides necessary grounds for a positive 
evaluation of state intervention in the form of social policies, which in turn forms higher regards 
about public welfare state institutions and more confidence in them. The specification of 
decommodification levels on a functional basis hence provides more evidence of crowding-in 
effects.  
 
 Table 6.: Policy-specific effects of decommodification for two social provisions4   
Source: Own calculations based on the WVS  
                                                          
4
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they are referred to in Table 7.3 
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
Pensioners  
 
Unemployed   Pensioners   Unemployed   
 
Decommodification 
indexes for pension 
policy  
Decommodification 
indexes for 
unemployment 
policy  
 
 
0.165*** 
 
 
 
 
0.350*** 
  
-0.011 
 
 
 
 
0.106 
 
Variance at the 
individual level  
9.986 (0.257) 10.640 (0.539)  Not calculated  Not calculated  
 
Variance at the 
country  level  
0.440 (0.098) 0.264 (0.209)  0.294 (0.073) 0.376 (0.178) 
 
 Policy-specific effects are also present in the case of interpersonal trust. The total level of 
decommodification is initially found to positively correlate to interpersonal trust levels. This is 
however not true for pension and unemployment policies. They both show a neutral relationship 
to trust levels among their direct recipients. The specification of decommodification on a 
functional basis does not confirm the positive influence that decommodification may have on 
interpersonal trust. The neutral relationship at least excludes the possibility of crowding-out effects 
that decommodification levels may have on confidence in other people.  
The question that arises is why the effects of decommodification are different for the two 
social provisions. They are stronger for unemployment policy as opposed to pension policy. The 
underlying logic of the answer consists in the different levels of redistributive effects between the 
two social provisions on the one hand, and the different perception of decommodification by 
different social groups on the other.   
The first argument is based on the idea that redistributive effects are not identical across 
social provisions. Since unemployment policy more positively correlates to social trust levels, it is 
logical to assume that redistributive effects of the latter will be stronger than for pensions. The 
calculation provided in Table 7.5 indeed supports this assumption.  
When controlling for income inequality levels, the initial correlation between 
decommodification levels and social trust changes. For instance, when controlling for 
redistributive effects of pensions, the correlation between decommodification and interpersonal 
trust changes from -0.109 to -0.394. In the case of unemployment benefits, this change is much 
stronger: from 0.420 to -0.035. Redistributive effects of unemployment benefits are thus larger 
compared to pensions. The same is also true for institutional trust.  
The second explanation that an understanding of why the decommodification of pensions 
is less positive stems from the different perceptions of decommodification levels among different 
social groups. One should take into account not the actual level of decommodification, but rather 
the perceived one. It is possible to assume that pensioners might consider their pensions and hence 
the decommodification level the pensions are associated with as not high enough. They compare 
what they get with what they paid to the pension system during their work history. They also regard 
their pensions as much less than what they contributed, which can be deduced from the fact that 
pensioners have the most negative attitudes towards welfare states (Goul Andersen, 2002). On the 
other hand, they compare their income when being pensioners with what they had while working. 
In this case, pensioners are again negative since, as the WVS data show, pensioners are the least 
satisfied with their income among all social groups. Their satisfaction with income equals only 3.7 
,whereas the working population have a much higher score (6.2). The data also show that income 
drops considerably when moving to retirement. In Germany for instance, the household income of 
pensioners was only 29,000 euros in 2002, while it amounted to 41,500 for civil servants, and 
37,000 for the employed. (Huinink and Schröder, 2008). This negative approach might greatly 
affect trust in both people and public institutions. The unemployed are more positive in both 
respects. The absence of an alternative source of income and relatively higher satisfaction with 
unemployment benefits might contribute to the fact that the unemployed perceive the 
decommodification level guaranteed by unemployment benefits as high. This is also supported by 
the perception that what they pay to unemployment is much less than what they get from the state 
while unemployed.  
Nevertheless, these results are to some extent controversial. The fact that the 
decommodification of unemployment benefits is associated with more positive effects on both 
forms of trust is inconsistent with the data. Pensions provide much higher levels of 
decommodification than unemployment benefits as can be easily deduced from the table below. 
The positive effect of pensions on social trust must be hence stronger than the decommodification 
effect of unemployment benefits.  
 
Table 7. Decommodification indexes for pension and unemployment policies  
 
Country 
Decommodification index 
Pension policy Unemployment policy 
N. Zealand  9.1 4.0 
Italy 9.6 5.1 
Japan 10.5 5.0 
France 12.0 6.3 
Finland 14.0 5.2 
Belgium 15.0 8.6 
Denmark 15.0 8.1 
Sweden 17.0 7.1 
Source: Bambra (2006) 
 The table explicitly illustrates that almost always, the decommodification levels for 
pensions is much higher compared to those for unemployment benefits. The positive effects must 
hence be stronger for the former than for the latter. This is however not the case. A possible 
explanation for this is the fact that the positive effects of decommodification found in Table 7.4are 
not linear and slow down as decommodification levels go up. We do not intend to check this and 
leave this argument as an assumption rather than our hypothesis.  
Therefore, the specification of decommodification levels on a functional basis provides 
results that advocate for the presence of policy specific effects. Thus, the analysis of  the outcome 
dimension cannot be limited to the decommodification that all social policies guarantee; it must 
be disaggregated on a functional basis and related to trust levels among their direct recipients. But 
it should be emphasized that the disaggregation of the cumulative decommodification score does 
not provide any evidence of crowding-out. In the worst scenario, the estimation points to a neutral 
relationship between decommodification levels and social trust scores.  
The analysis also advocates that even if pension spending has negative effects on social 
trust revealed in the functional dimension, the outcome dimension does not support these findings. 
The levels of decommodification of pension policy have a positive effect on institutional trust and 
a neutral effect on interpersonal trust among pensioners. Other findings are in line with the results 
obtained in the functional dimension.  
 
 
 
3. Stratification and social trust levels 
Many welfare state scholars focuse their attention on social policy expansion and 
retrenchment in advanced capitalist democracies measured to a large degree through social 
expenditures. This focus results in a lack of emphasis on how social policy structures society 
(Scruggs and Allan, 2006a). This question is central to the analysis provided by Esping-Andersen 
(1990). The main objective is to show that welfare programs of similar ‘size’ (in terms of 
commitments) can produce very different outcomes overall. This approach exposes an additional 
dimension with which one can classify welfare states beyond efforts or generosity. This dimension 
refers to stratification effects of welfare states.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), welfare states are key institutions in the structuring 
of class and social order, while their organizational features help determine the articulation of 
social solidarity, division of class, and status differentiating. He distinguishes between three 
different traditions in stratifying society, each of which is inherent to the three welfare regime 
types.  
 
Conservative Social Stratification  
Conservative welfare states have been historically associated with a strong state, a 
significant role for religion in society, and ‘an old style’ corporatist economic order (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Conservative welfare regimes are defined by Esping-Andersen (1990) as loathe 
to combine social levelling and class antagonism brought about by capitalism. The unifying 
scheme is that traditional status relations must be retained for the sake of social integration. This 
model of welfare is rooted in the specificity of state development with its tradition in feudal 
manorial societies of welfare state structure.  
In promoting propositions for policy introduction, leaders desire the primacy of etatism 
with the purpose of chaining workers directly to the paternal authority of a monarchy. The 
paternalism of the state strongly influenced two areas of social policy. One is endowing civil 
servants with extraordinarly lavish welfare provisions to reward or guarantee their loyalty to the 
state. Another legacy of paternalism is found in the evolution of social assistance. More 
specifically, poor relief was more humane and generous than in countries with liberal regimes.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), a major alternative to etatism is corporatism. The 
unifying principle of conservatism is fraternity based on status identity, obligatory and exclusive 
membership, mutualism, and monopoly of representation. Corporatism seeks to uphold 
traditionally recognized status distinctions and use these as organizational nexus for society and 
the economy (Eping-Andersen, 1990). Corporatism also influenced the social policy design either 
because of state recognition of particular status privileges or because organized groups refused to 
be part of a more status-inclusive legislation, thereby emerged a tradition of constructing a myriad 
of status-oriented social insurance schemes – each with its peculiar rules, finances, and benefits 
structure and each tailored to exhibit its clientele’s relative status position (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).  
Corporatism did not contradict either to visions of the church. For the Catholic church, 
corporatism was a natural response to its preoccupation with preserving the traditional family, its 
search for viable alternatives to both socialism and capitalism, and its beliefs in the possibility to 
organize harmonious relations between social classes. Corporatism inserted itself easily into the 
Catholic subsidiarity principle. The main idea was that higher and larger levels of social 
collectivity should intervene only when a family’s capacity for mutual protection was rendered 
impossible (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
As a result, social policy in conservative welfare regimes was designed to preserve existing 
status differences in society. Faced with the potential for instability introduced by the emergence 
of modern capitalism, social policy became a way to reinforce a ‘natural’ social order. Thus, 
despite the fact that conservative welfare regimes were characterized by higher levels of social 
expenditures, the contents of social policy was designed to reinforce the existing order.  
 
Liberal Social stratification  
While conservative social policy attempted to preserve traditional patterns of social 
stratification, liberal welfare regimes sought the opposite. Classical liberals reasoned that 
traditional social patterns constrain individual freedom and that a free market affords individuals 
the ability to realize their potential without the fetters imposed by the pre-existing social 
hierarchies of church and state alike.  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990), the goals of liberalism were the abolishment of 
estates, monopolies, and absolutism in order to create conditions for individual emancipation, 
freedom, equal opportunities and healthy competitiveness. He further specifies that the main role 
was given to the market that produced stratification, while the state had no right or reason to 
interfere in the results produced in the marketplace. They were recognized as mirrored efforts, 
motivation, adeptness, and self-reliance.  
Social policy was minimized in liberal regimes since it was equated with undesirable 
stratification outcomes: paternalism and etatism, dependency on the state, and the perpetuation of 
pauperism. The internal reasoning of liberalism was the dogma that the state had no proper reason 
for altering stratification outcomes produced by the market. Ideally, it was understood that without 
a state or monopolies, there would be no classes: just a web of freely acting individuals equal 
before the law, the contract, and the cash nexus. (Esping-Andersen, 1990)   
Esping-Andersen (1990) emphasize that liberalism’s universalistic ideals were 
contradicted by the dualism and social stigma it promoted in practice. More specifically, liberal 
states established a punitive and stigmatizing poor relief for market failures. This humiliating 
approach in poor relief was preserved even when liberalism moved towards modern income-tested 
social assistance. Mean-tested relief was meant to be the residual element of liberal social policy. 
The real core was understood to be individual insurance in the market, while social policy would 
only parallel market outcomes.  
However, liberalism had great difficulties applying this conception to state policy.  As 
Esping-Andersen (1990) writes, its enthusiasm for the need-tested approach, targeting the state 
aim only at the genuinely poor resulted in social stigma and dualism. An alternative approach to 
organize an individual’s welfare through private insurance also contributed to class dualisms. It 
occurred due to the fact that private welfare logically replicated market inequalities, while 
prevailing mostly among the upper-class. Esping-Andersen (1990) concludes that liberal social 
insurance schemes reproduce the profile of stratification of the market while promoting private 
protection for the more fortunate.  
In designing social policies, liberal regimes manifested themselves in programs that 
encourage more extensive interaction with the market for income maintenance and insurance 
against risks posed by illness and especially old age. In other words, in choosing the emphasis on 
public versus private remedies to social risks, liberal regimes had a strong tendency to favor the 
latter approach.  As a result, liberal regimes represented a curious mix of individual self-
responsibility and dualism: society is divided into two groups with one embracing those who 
unfortunately rely on stigmatizing relief, while the second includes privileged people capable of 
deriving their welfare from the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
 
Social democratic stratification  
The third welfare regime type is the social democratic model which is oriented on 
construction solidarity among workers. In their struggle for labor solidarity, socialists faced two 
main obstacles. On the one hand, they had to fight corporatism along with the paternalism of 
employers and the state. They also had to oppose against the atomizing, individualizing impulse 
of the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). On the other hand, the serious obstacle to solidarity laid, 
as Esping-Andersen (1990) specifies, in the social divisions institutionalized through earlier 
conservative and liberal reforms. The abolishing of the old poor law was priority number one for 
politicians. The main task was to design such a policy that both addressed the real need for social 
relief and would help the socialist movement come to power. The question revolved around 
contending principles of solidarity. One approach was to build a corporatism model. A second 
approach was to place the social question in the hands of the trade unions and win concessions 
through collective bargaining. Both approaches were however unlikely to produce broad solidarity.  
The socialist movements turned to the third alternative, which assumed that the movement 
itself become the provider of workers’ welfare. This became especially possible with the extension 
and consolidation of democratic rights. Esping-Andersen (1990) explains that parliamentarism 
presented the socialists with new reformist vistas but also imposed upon them the necessity to 
mobilize solid electoral majorities, which the getto strategy would almost certainly fail to produce. 
Universalism did not collapse even in the wake of middle-classes. The solution was to combine 
universal entitlements with high earnings-graduated benefits, thus matching welfare state benefits 
and services to middle class expectations. In this way, they attained broader equality through non-
market mechanisms (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
Thus, the social democratic welfare state was designed to promote universalism since it 
equalized the status, benefits, and responsibilities of citizenship and because it helped build a 
political coalition.  
 
By reflecting different stratification goals Esping-Andersen (1990) provides three separate 
indexes of stratification – conservative, liberal, and socialist – with the expectation that welfare 
states scoring highly on one dimension are unlikel to score highly on other dimensions. The 
component measures that comprise each index are successfully described by Scruggs and Allan 
(2006a). 
Conservative social stratification is reflected by two indicators that illustrate the status 
differences and the privileged position of the state in conservative welfare regimes. The 
corporatism variable records the segmentation of public pension programs based upon major 
occupational categories. The second measure - etatism – reflects the level of pension expenditure 
for government employees as a percentage of gross domestic product (Scruggs and Allan, 2006a). 
Liberal social stratification is measured through three indexes that reflect the extent to 
which market solutions are emphasized in social policy. The first indicator measures the relative 
importance of normal means-tested poor relief as a share of overall public social expenditures. In 
the area of pensions, the ratio of private pensions to total pensions measures the public-private 
mix. Similarly, private health spending as a share of total health expenditures attempts to do the 
same with health care (Scruggs and Allan, 2006a). 
Socialist social stratification is defined by two measures. Universalism is measured by the 
average portion of the workforce eligible for benefits in three social insurance programs: 
unemployment, sickness, and old-age pensions. Benefit equality measures are based on the ratio 
of basic benefits to maximum allowable benefits averaged over the same three programs (Scruggs 
and Allan, 2006a).  
The stratification indexes replicated by Scruggs and Allan (2006a) are reported in the table 
below.  
 
Table 8.: Stratification indexes by welfare regime type 
Source: Calculations based on Scruggs and Allan  (2006a) 
 Scores on 
Conservatism Liberalism Socialism 
Social democratic  
 
4.5 5.9 5.4 
Liberal  
 
1.0 8.1 4.3 
Conservative  
 
6.4 5.7 3.1 
 It is clear from the table that liberal regimes score heavily on liberal measures compared to 
insignificant levels on socialist and conservatist measures. The same is true for conservatism. 
Countries, included in this group, score strongly on conservatist measures and to a limited degree 
on socialist measures and to some extent on liberal measures. Countries belonging to social 
democratic regimes score highly on socialist measures and also tome extent on liberal and 
conservatist measures.  
An aggregated level of analysis of stratification effects provides mixed results. In 
conservative welfare regimes, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between 
levels of stratification and institutional trust. In the case of interpersonal trust, the relationship is 
negative but not statistically significant, which suggests that the effect of stratification is neutral. 
As in the previous case, controlling for income inequality rends the relationship negative, which 
is only statistically significant for interpersonal trust. In conservative welfare regimes, social 
policy hence affect social trust mostly through the reduction of income inequality, which is an 
effective instrument in raising trust levels among individuals. When controlling for 
fractionalization, wealth, and percentage of Protestants living in countries, the relationship 
becomes negative, especially for interpersonal trust. The direct effect of stratification on social 
trust is hence negative, although it does not appear statistically significant in any of the cases. Only 
when controlling for corruption are the direct effects of stratification on social trust positive and 
statistically significant. Interpersonal trust is thus very sensitive to how fairly public institutions 
treat individuals, which is surprisingly less important for defining institutional trust in conservative 
welfare regimes.  
In liberal welfare regimes, the direct correlation between stratification scores and social 
trust is positive for institutional trust and negative for interpersonal trust. Controlling for all five 
covariates changes the value of correlation coefficients, although the significance test failed in all 
cases. What is surprising here is that the effect of income inequality is weaker due to the fact that 
social policy is less effective in reducing income inequalities in liberal welfare regimes. The 
strongest impact stems from controlling for corruption. The latter can be explained by the 
prevalence in liberal countries of means-tested benefit schemes and thus, how public institutions 
treat potential recipients becomes crucially important.  
In social democratic welfare regimes, the relationship between stratification scores and 
social trust is positive for both forms of trust, but only statistically significant for interpersonal 
trust.  Although the universal approach of socialism can be considered most effective in reducing 
income inequality, we do not find a strong impact of this covariate on the relationship in question. 
Controlling for income inequality slightly changes the value of partial correlation coefficients. 
What matters here most is the way public institutions operate, especially in the case of institutional 
trust. More effective institutions, which can be observed from the general trend of a country’s 
wealth and the level of corruption in these institutions, trigger higher regards towards them. The 
relationship between interpersonal trust and stratification scores is less affected by the efficiency 
of public institutions. In general, it should be noted that this relationship remains positive even 
after controlling for all five country-level covariates. In social democratic welfare regimes, the 
effects of stratification scores on interpersonal trust are hence positive in most cases.  
Thus, the aggregated level analysis point to the fact that the crowding-out hypothesis hold 
true when controlling for income inequality. In the rest of the cases, the relationship is  positive 
suggesting that stratification of any type leads to an increase in both forms of trust. We can also 
obtain a negative sign, but the relationship under analysis remains statistically insignificant, which 
advocates for the absence of crowding-out effects. These results greatly contradict our 
expectations. One might expect a negative sign for liberal stratification scores and a positive sign 
for conservative and social democratic stratification scores.  
 
Table 9.: The correlation between stratification indexes and social trust, controlling for 
country-level characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation 
between 
stratification 
levels  and 
social trust 
 
 
 
Controlled for 
 
Fractiona
lization  
 
Wealth 
 
 
Income 
Inequality  
 
Corruption  
 
% of 
Protestants  
 
Conservative  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
-0.175 
 
0.571* 
 
 
 
-0.332 
 
-0.283 
 
 
-0.153 
 
0.065 
 
 
-0.552** 
 
-0.451 
 
 
0.412* 
 
0.208 
 
 
-0.224 
 
-0.158 
Liberal  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
 
-0.044 
 
0.571* 
 
 
 
0.188 
 
0.224 
 
 
 
-0.072 
 
0.348 
 
 
0.194 
 
0,152 
 
 
-0.305 
 
-0.283 
 
 
 
-0.013 
 
0.125 
Social democratic        
Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey  
 
The aggregated level of analysis thus provides results that point out that the direct 
relationship between social trust and stratification scores can be negative in some cases, although 
it is rarely statistically significant. This should however be interpreted with some caution since the 
small number of cases at the aggregated level could be responsible for the failure of the 
significance test in providing positive outcomes.  
At the individual-level of analysis, our expectations are based on the assumption that 
certain types of stratification may lead to crowding-out in institutional and interpersonal trust. If 
the classical crowding-out hypothesis states that social trust should be lower in the countries with 
more developed social obligations, one can expect:  
Hypothesis 5.1.: Higher scores on social democratic stratification should be associated with lower 
levels of both forms of social trust. 
Hypothesis 5.2.:  Conservative stratification scores are expected to negatively correlate with levels 
of interpersonal and institutional trust.  
Hypothesis 5.3.: Higher liberal stratification scores are expected to positively correlate with social 
trust indexes.  
 
1. Interpersonal trust 
 
2. Institutional trust 
 
 
0.487** 
 
0.314 
 
 
0.316 
 
0.107 
 
 
 
0.434 
 
-0.052 
 
0.396 
 
0.396 
 
0.324 
 
-0.128 
 
 
 
0.359 
 
0.217 
With respect to individual-level stratification effects on social trust, we obtain results that 
are not fully in line with our expectations (see table below).  
 
Table 10.: The influence of stratification on trust levels: an individual-level analysis5 
 Source: Own calculations based on the World Values Survey 
 
For interpersonal trust, crowding-out can be expected in the case of liberalism and 
crowding-in in the cases of conservatism and socialism. The conservative approach to organizing 
welfare aimed at preserving existing class structures affects interpersonal trust positively. More 
                                                          
5
 The coefficients on control variables are not reported since they coincide with those in Table 7.3.  
 Institutional trust   
 
             Interpersonal trust 
Conservatism  Liberalism Socialism  
 
Conservatism  Liberalism Socialism  
 
 
Stratification 
indexes  
Conservatism  
Liberalism  
Socialism  
 
 
 
 
-0.071*** 
 
 
 
 
0.193*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.190*** 
 
 
 
0.051*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.022*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.091*** 
Variance at 
individual level 
 
9.275  
(0.111) 
9.271 
(0.111) 
9.272 
(0.111) 
Not  
calculated  
Not 
calculated  
Not 
calculated  
Variance at 
country level 
 
0.285  
(0.020) 
0.434 
(0.031) 
0.224 
(0.016) 
0.125  
(0.007) 
0.184 
(0.112) 
0.265 
(0.017) 
specifically, an increase in conservatist measures by one point increases the odds of trusting others 
by 5.23 percent. It does not matter that the welfare is provided with the aim of reproducing the 
class structure of society. People might consider it fair that welfare institutions support individuals 
based on their work history or place in the social structure, since it positively affects an individual’s 
trust in other people. The class-related approach is hence relatively successful in organizing 
welfare provisions to members of society. What becomes more important for interpersonal trust is 
the fact that an individual is supported by the state when he or she experiences social contingencies. 
The mechanisms through which it does so are less important. Interpersonal trust is thus very 
sensitive to the presence of state support as such rather than to the kind of stratification that results 
from state intervention.  
Socialism was also found to lead to crowding-in effects: an increase in socialist measures 
by one point tends to increase the odds of trusting by 9.53 percent. The effect is thus almost twice 
as strong than for conservatism, which is quite modest but still advocates for the presence of a 
positive influence. An approach aimed at supporting individual independence is hence more 
productive of interpersonal trust than that aimed at preserving the existing class structure. What is 
important for interpersonal trust is how equally individuals are treated. Only in a society where all 
individuals are subject to the same treatment can trust in other people thrive. Since socialism 
guarantees equality in both input and output, it is very effective in producing high trust indexes. 
Equality is provided as the input since people are treated equally without taking into account their 
position in the class structure when defining access to, and the amount of, benefits. Equality is also 
provided as the output, since the convergence of individuals’ welfare at higher levels is the desired 
outcome of social democratic regimes. The absence of apriori or posteriori stratification in welfare 
state provisions is a vital instrument for building trusting societies.  
In the case of liberalism, the total effect is negative, which suggests that liberal social policy 
leads to the erosion of interpersonal trust among individuals. It is not however clear whether the 
total effect is the result of the impact of stratification or of the institutional design of welfare state 
systems. It is reasonable to assume that socialist measures largely reflect the universal approach to 
organizing the delivery of social provisions, while the liberal one reflects means-testing principles 
of organizing an individual’s welfare. In any case, it is clear that creating a dualism in society can 
ruin interpersonal trust. This is due to the fact that interpersonal trust is very sensitive to two 
aspects. First, it can be ruined by stigmatizing individuals. If access to social provisions is based 
on the principle of creating a stigma for those experiencing social risks, people may feel unequal. 
Moreover, the cliental of welfare states feel inferior to other individuals, who can generate personal 
welfare without the state’s help. Creating a stigma through entitlements to social provisions thus 
ruins social trust in other people. The same result can appear through another similar process, 
namely, through isolating those in need in a distinct group. As Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue, 
this can create distrust for ‘problem’ people towards the rest of the population and also the trust of 
other people towards the needy. Interpersonal trust is thus considerably influenced by how to treat 
‘problem’ people.  
This also points out that the effects welfare states have on social trust cannot be fully 
outweighed by the fact that the state provides individuals with financial support. The organization 
of welfare provisions for individuals plays a crucial role in defining the level of interpersonal trust 
in society. If social provisions are aimed at preserving existing class structures, their effect on 
interpersonal trust becomes less positive. If their aim is to somehow punish an individual 
experiencing social risks by stigmatizing him or her, the positive effects turn into negative.  
In the case of institutional trust, the results suggest the possibility of crowding-out for 
conservatism and crowding-in for liberalism and socialism. An increase in the measures of 
conservatism by one point decreases institutional trust by 0.071 points when individual 
characteristics are kept constant. Conservative stratification hence tends to negatively influence 
confidence in public welfare state institutions, which are aimed at preserving existing class 
structures. The general principle of organizing an individual’s welfare based on an individual’s 
work history and an individual’s placement in the social structure might produce negative effects 
on trust in public welfare institutions. In order to explain this, one should bear in mind the fact that 
confidence in public institutions essentially depends on the  way of their functioning on society 
and social order. In conservative welfare regimes, economic well-being is heavily dependent on 
the place of individuals in the social structure. It reproduces the existing social order through 
welfare provisions without providing easy  upward class mobility. Welfare state institutions thus 
perpetuate class differences, which makes people feel unequal. Such institutions produce negative 
attitudes towards them which results in low levels of institutional trust. Another reason for the 
negative effects of conservative approach on institutional trust might stem from the fact that 
conservatism uses selective principles to organize welfare provisions. The existence of different 
funds for different professions or social groups entails treating people differently. This again can 
create distance between groups of people in society and, as a result, lower trust in public welfare 
institutions.  
What is surprising is that an increase in the measures of liberalism leads to an increase in 
institutional trust by 0.193 points, which goes against general logic that assumes that means-testing 
and stigmatizing ruin individuals’ confidence in public institutions. It is plausible to infer here that 
the fact that the state provides an individual with financial aid outweighs the negative impact of 
the way this welfare is provided. For institutional trust, it is not important that people have to go 
through bureaucratic hassle and control to obtain social benefits. It is also not important that the 
needy are isolated in a distinct group and stigmatized as recipients of social benefits. What is 
important for institutional trust is that these institutions help individuals when they are having 
difficulties. It is important that they are not left alone when they are out of the labor market. The 
welfare state becomes a partner in securing well-being even if it creates a dualism in society. 
Moreover, liberalism creates equal conditions for all applicants for public help and hence it treats 
all those in need equally, since they all have to go through means-tested procedures. In addition, 
each of them is entitled to the same package of benefits that stem from the same public funds which 
creates quasi ‘equality’ among the recipients of social benefits.  
Positive effects are also obtained for socialist measures: an increase in the socialist index 
by one point is associated with an average increase of 0.190 points in institutional trust. Providing 
individuals with welfare on a universal basis can be considered an instrument of increasing 
institutional trust.  The strong influence of socialism may also stem from the fact that socialist 
social policy is aimed at the creation of an egalitarian society, in which individuals are not only 
equal but also independent from the labor market. It suggests that the convergence of individuals’ 
welfare is a strong predictor for trust in public welfare institutions. This becomes even more 
important when this convergence happens at a high level. Furthermore, equal access to welfare 
provisions provided on a universal basis enhances trust in public welfare institutions. Finally, 
individual independence from family ties and the labor market guaranteed by the welfare state 
might be another reason for the high evaluations of the institutions in which the provisions of 
welfare are embedded. 
Institutional trust is thus more sensitive to how individuals are treated. If they are treated 
equally by the system, they tend to express higher confidence in public welfare institutions. This 
occurs even if this is a ‘negative equality’, which means that those in need are subject to the same 
bureaucratic hassles and control as in liberal welfare states. If equality is disturbed and social 
benefits depend on the place of an individual in the social structure as in conservative welfare 
states, then people are unlikely to be trusting towards these institutions because they perpetuate 
the existing social order. What is also important for institutional trust is the fact that an individual 
is supported by welfare states, whereas how this support is organized becomes inferior and 
secondary for the process of generating institutional trust in society. This supports the integration 
argument that emphasizes the importance of the support of individuals by welfare states in the case 
of need.  
The specification of the outcome dimension reveals the fact that in some cases, crowding-
out is present in the relationship between social policy outcomes and social trust levels. More 
specifically, the generosity of social spending that guarantees high levels of decommodification 
usually leads to crowding-in effects in interpersonal and institutional trust.  Stratification affects 
social trust elements in a different way. Preserving the existing class structure inherent to 
conservative welfare regimes negatively influences institutional trust but positively affects 
interpersonal trust. The stigmatizing approach of liberal welfare states erodes interpersonal trust 
but boosts institutional trust. Finally, socialism’s universal approach leads to crowding-in effects 
in both forms of social trust.  
 
 
Overview and concluding remarks 
This chapter studies the outcome effect of social policy, which forms the outcome 
dimension. The first sub-chapter provides arguments in favor of the introduction of an outcome 
spectrum in the social trust analysis. The analysis is conducted by relating the level of 
decommodification and stratification in the selected 18 OECD countries to interpersonal and 
institutional trust indexes among their populations. The aggregated level of analysis advocates that 
the integration and institutional arguments are valid in explaining the effects of welfare state 
development on social trust formation. The results obtained at the individual level of analysis 
provide mixed evidence. First, welfare regimes’ dummies show that both forms of trust are lowest 
in liberal welfare regimes, highest in Scandinavian countries, and moderate in continental Europe. 
When directly assessing the impact of decommodification on trust levels, we find evidence of 
crowding-in for both forms of social trust. It should be noted however that the impact of 
decommodification contains an explicit functional dimension, which assumes that its effects differ 
across social provisions. As the analysis confirms, the effects of welfare states on social trust are 
policy specific and should be studied for each social provision separately.  
Stratification affects social trust elements in a different way. The preserving of the existing 
class structure, which is inherent to conservative welfare regimes, negatively influences 
institutional trust but positively affects interpersonal trust. The stigmatizing approach of liberal 
welfare states erodes interpersonal trust but boosts institutional trust. Finally, socialism’s universal 
approach leads to crowding-in effects in both forms of social trust.  
The results obtained reveal that regardless of the way welfare state development is 
operationalized, one can expect that its impact on institutional and interpersonal trust is positive in 
most cases. These findings are in line with empirical studies which directly or indirectly test the 
crowding-out hypothesis (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005; Knack and 
Zack, 2001). Social spending can hence be used as a good proxy for decommodification levels 
since both measures lead to the same findings that demonstrate a positive impact on social trust.  
The impact of the outcome dimension should be considered a product of both 
decommodification and stratification. This stems from the fact that social trust indexes are usually 
significantly higher in social democratic welfare regimes compared to liberal and conservative 
regimes (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Along with decommodification, the stratification 
mechanism can hence be regarded as effective in manipulating trust.  
Based on the relationship of trust with decommodification and social stratification, it is 
possible to say that the recent trend towards liberalism may result in social trust levels going down, 
especially in the case of interpersonal trust. For this form of trust, the effect will be joined, since 
lower levels of decommodification and the stigmatizing-like approach of stratification 
mechanisms may ruin the confidence of individuals in other people. For institutional trust, the 
negative impact of the liberal paradigm will stem mostly from reduced decommodification levels.  
What remains unclear is the mechanism that underlies the relationship of interest. There 
must be many links between welfare states and social trust through which the effect materializes. 
Based on the aggregated level of analysis, it is possible to conclude that the effect itself is at least 
dubious. Welfare states boost trust by reducing income inequality levels and by improving the 
performance of public institutions. But the direct effect can also be negative because of the erosion 
by social policy of social networks or individuals’ morality. An additional research is necessary to 
study the mechanism of the relationship between welfare states and social trust.   
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